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Erik M. Jensen is Associate Professor of Law at 
Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, 
Ohio. This article was written in the course of his 
academic pursuits. 
In this article, Jensen closely inspects footnote 3 
in the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. 
General Dynamics. 'In that case, governed by the 
law as it existed before the TRA of 1984, the Court 
denied General Dynamics a deduction attributable 
to claims for employee medical expenses until the 
claims were approved. In the footnote, the Court 
suggested that the 1984 amendments to section 
461(h) of the Code postponing the time for de-
ducting accrued expenses until economic perfor-
mance would, in a similar case today, defer General 
Dynamics' deduction still further, until time of pay-
ment. Jensen argues that the Court was wrong as a 
general matter even though its suggestion may 
accidentally lead to the right timing result in some 
cases. He argues that the Supreme Court misread 
the legislative history of section 461 (h) and provided 
no theoretical reason for treating economic perfor-
mance as occurring at the time of payment (rather 
than the time services are provided) in the case of 
"employee benefit liabilities." Moreover, the Court 
ignored the potential effects of other sections of the 
Code, such as section 404, which may control the 
timing of deductions associated with deferred bene-
fits provided through unfunded medical reimburse-
ment plans. 
This article was originally published, in different 
form, as part of a longer article in 22 Georgia Law 
Review No. 2 (1988) and is reprinted with permis-
sion. The author gratefully acknowledges the many 
helpful comments made on an earlier draft of this 
revised and updated version by Helen B. Jensen, 
Esq., and Dale .P. Shrallow, Esq. 
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THE SUPREME COURT'S 
MISlEADING FOOTNOTE 
IN GENERAl DYNAMICS 
by Erik M. Jensen 
Within the past three years, the Supreme Court has 
decided two cases dealing with the timing of deductions 
by accrual-basis taxpayers. United States v. Hughes 
Properties, Inc.,' involving a casino's deduction of the net 
increase in its progressive jackpot obligations for the 
year, and United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 2 
concerning a medical self-insurer's deduction of additions 
to its reserve for "incurred but not reported" claims, have 
many failings, including misapplication of the "all events" 
test and internal inconsistency. 3 This article examines 
one specific failing: in footnote 3 of its opinion in General 
Dynamics, the Supreme Court misstated changes made 
by the Tax Reform Act of 1984 in a way that may lead the · 
unwary reader into major planning mistakes. 
The Court ... provided a very misleading im-
pression of the analysis necessary after the 
Tax Reform Acts of 1984 and 1986 . ... 
Although decided in 1986 and 1987, the cases were 
governed by the law as it existed prior to the Tax Reform 
Act of 1984.4 That the Court spent its time on these 
controversies is curious in itself. The 1984 Act made 
changes, particularly in adding the "economic perfor-
mance" requirement of Code section 461 (h), that will 
affect the analysis, if not always the result, in similar 
cases in the future. 5 Whatever the merits of granting the 
petitions for certiorari, however, the Court had no reason 
to invoke the new statute in its opinions. In footnote 3 of 
General Dynamics, the Court did so anyway. It provided 
a very misleading impression of the analysis necessary 
after the Tax Reform Acts of 1984 and 1986 to determine 
1476 u.s. 593 (1986). 
2107 S. Ct. 1732 (1987). 
3The author has examined the cases at length in Jensen, "The 
Supreme Court and the Timing of Deductions for Accrual-Basis 
Taxpayers," 22 Georgia Law Review 229 (1988). 
'The changes affecting timing made by the Tax Reform Act of 
1984 are generally effective for deductions that, under prior law, 
would have been allowable after July 18, 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-
369, section 91 (g)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 608. 
5 For some ruminations about why the Court might have 
granted certiorari in the wake of the statutory changes, see 
Jensen, "Hughes Properties and General Dynamics: The Su-
preme Court, The All Events Test, and the 1984 Tax Act," 32 Tax 
Notes 911-12 (1986). 
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the timing of deductions associated with "employee bene-
fit liabilities." 
This article explains why footnote 3 is at best misleading 
and at worst dead wrong. The article first discusses the 
applicable law prior to the 1984 Act and describes how 
the Supreme Court applied that Jaw in Genera/Dynamics. 
Part II describes in generalthe effectof the 1984 Act on 
the analysis of the deductibility of future obligations. Part 
Ill analyzes footnote 3 of General Dynamics in light of the 
theory and legislative history of the 1984 Act. Finally, Part 
IV suggests the proper analysis required under present 
law to determine the. timing of deductions associated 
with an unfunded medical reimbursement plan like that in 
General Dynamics. 
I. Pre-1984 Act Law 
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1984, an accrual-basis 
taxpayer was in general required to satisfy the two. 
prongs of the regulatory "all events" test in order to 
deduct an otherwise accruable liability in the current tax-
able year. 6 Tile taxpayer had to demonstrate that "all the 
events have occurred which determine the fact of the 
liability" and that "the amount thereof can be demon-
strated with reasonable accuracy."7 As Hughes Properties 
and General Dynamics reached the Supreme Court, both 
cases implicated only the first prong of the test, the fact 
of liability. a To meet that requirement, a taxpayer had to 
prove the absence of contingencies (other than the 
obligor's ability to pay) that could defeat the obligation. 9 
The Commissioner . .. maintained that the fact 
of liability could be established only upon 
approval of a claim. 
The fact of liability issue in General Dynamics was a 
common one. Under collective bargaining agreements, 
General Dynamics Corp. was required to provide health 
insurance coverage for its employees, and in 1972 it 
became a self-insurer. It established reserves to meet its 
estimated liability and retained the two insurance firms 
that had earlier provided coverage to evaluate and ap-
'This article considers only timing issues-that is, the proper 
taxable year for a deduction to be taken. It is assumed that statu-
tory authority (such as IRC sec. 162) exists for any deduction. 
'Reg. section 1.461-1 (a)(2) (emphasis added). 
'In Hughes Properties, the government had conceded at the 
outset the reasonable accuracy of the amount claimed as a 
deduction. 476 U.S. at 597. In General Dynamics, while disagree-
ing with the lower courts' resolution of the amount of liability 
issue, the government limited its petition for certiorari to the fact 
of liability. See 107 S. Ct. at 1735 n.2. 
9See, e.g., Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934). Although 
the taxpayer must generally show the absence of contingencies, 
the test is not read literally to require absolute certainty. Contin-
gencies of some sort always exist until the obligation is actually 
fulfilled (such as by payment). The cases have phrased the issue 
in terms of the absence of contingencies, but the underlying 
question appears to be "How contingent is too contingent?" 
See Jensen, "The Deduction of Future Liabilities by Accrual-
Basis Taxpayers: Premature Accruals, the All Events Test, and 
Economic Performance," 37 University of Florida Law Review 
443, 455-56 (1985). 
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prove benefit claims. On its tax return for 1972, General 
Dynamics deducted its liability, as an ordinary and neces-
sary business expense, for medical services assumed to 
have been performed durir\g the year.'" It deducted not 
only its liability for those employees whose claims had 
been approved during the year, but also its estimated 
liability for claims during the year that either had not yet 
been filed, or, if filed, had not yet been approved. 11 
The Commissioner challenged the deductions attribu-
table to those claims that had not been approved by the 
end of 1972. He maintained that the fact of liability could 
be established~Only upon approval of a claim. Until that 
time, no one could be certain that an affected employee 
would file a claim or, if a claim was filed, that the plan 
administrator would approve reimbursement. 12 
General Dynamics prevailed in the lower courts, 13 but 
the Supreme Court largely accepted the Commissioner's 
position. The Court concluded that the filing of a claim by 
an employee is necessary to fix the fact of liability, and 
thus General Dynamics had improperly taken deductions 
in 1972 with respect to any medical services for which 
claims had not been filed by the end of that year. In 
addition, General Dynamics lost its 1972 deduction for 
claims that had been filed but had not yet been approved 
by the end of the year; the company had not created a 
record at trial to establish those potentially deductible 
amounts. 14 
Based on the law prior to the 1984 Act, including the 
Supreme Court's decision in General Dynamics, one can 
posit five stages in the lifespan of employees' claims 
under an employer's self-insurance plan. For estimates 
associated with medical services not yet performed and 
10 Genera/ Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1734-35. As a "self-insurer," 
General Dynamics took over the obligation to reimburse em-
ployees for medical expenses covered under its plans; the 
company was therefore providing insurance for its employees. 
General Dynamics followed actuarial principles in determining 
the amount of its deduction, but it did not claim to be an 
"insurance company" entitled for that reason to deduct additions 
to reserves. See IRC sec. 807 (permitting deduction for additions 
to reserves by life insurance companies); IRC sec. 832(b)(5) 
(permitting deduction for additions to reserves by non-life insur-
ance companies). Ct. Brooke, Dirig & Yuhas, "Taxation of HMOs 
After Section 461 (h) and General Dynamics," 68 Journal of 
Taxation 358 (1988) (suggesting that health maintenance organi-
zations try to qualify as insurance companies in order to deduct 
current additions to reserves for incurred but not reported 
claims). In fact, from General Dynamics' perspective, although 
the new arrangement was called "self-insurance," it was techni-
cally not insurance at all. General Dynamics was shifting none of 
its own risk to another, unrelated party. See Barker, "Federal in-
come Taxation and Captive Insurance," 6 Virginia Tax Review 
267, 280 (1986). 
"General Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1734-35. On its original 
return, General Dynamics deducted no part of the self-insurance 
reserves. However, upon commencement of an Internal Revenue 
Service audit, the company filed an amended return claiming 
entitlement to a deduction for the additions to the reserves. /d. at 
1735. 
"See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, General Dynamics 
(No. 85-1385). 
13 General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 250 
(1984), aff'd, 773 F.2d 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
"General Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1737. The Court noted the 
general proposition that the taxpayer must show its entitlement 
to a deduction, citing Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 514 
(1935). General Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1737. 
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claims therefore not yet filed, General Dynamics took no 
deductions, consistent with the common understanding 
of the all events test. With respect to medical services 
performed but claims not filed, General Dynamics had 
taken deductions-unsuccessfully, as it turned out, under 
the Supreme Court's decision. For additions to reserves 
associated with claims filed but not yet approved, the 
government had argued that no deduction was permis-
sible, but the company apparently would have prevailed if 
it had proven the amount attributable to such claims. For 
approved but unpaid claims, there was no dispute about 
deductibility. Finally, a fortiori, paid (and previously un-
deducted) claims were currently deductible. 
II. TRA of 1984 
In the 1984 Act, Congress significantly changed the 
rules governing the timing of deductions by accrual-
basis taxpayers. While retaining the all events test, and 
elevating it from the regulations to the Code, 15 section 
461 (h) requires that a deduction generally be taken no 
earlier than "economic performance." 16 As a result, to be 
entitled in the current taxable year to deduct an obligation 
payable in the future, a taxpayer must now demonstrate 
not only the fact and the amount of the liability, the two 
traditional components of the all events test, but also the 
occurrence of economic performance. 
The nature of the transaction determines the time when 
economic performance is deemed to occur. For example, 
economic performance attributable to an obligation to 
provide or pay for property or services occurs only as the 
property or services are provided. 17 Economic perfor-
mance with respect to a liability arising either under a 
worker's compensation statute or out of a tort occurs 
only as payment is made to another person. 18 The Secre-
tary of the Treasury is given authority to provide excep-
tions to these rules 19 and also to define economic per-
formance for cases not specifically covered by the 
statute. 20 
Section 461 (h) generally operates to defer deductions 
beyond the time that they could have been taken under 
pre-1984 Act law. 21 Indeed, the section was added to the 
Code because of the congressional perception that, under 
the historical all events test, accrual-basis taxpayers had 
been able to generate deductions that exceeded the true 
15 IRC sec. 461 (h) (4) follows the language of the regulations: 
"the all events test is met with respect to any item if all events 
have occurred which determine the fact of liability and the 
amount of such liability can be determined with reasonable 
accuracy." 
'siRC sec:461(h)(1). 
11 IRC sees. 461 (h)(2)(A). 461 (h)(2)(B). 
18 IRC sec. 461 (h)(2)(C). 
19 IRC sec. 461 (h)(2) (introductory language states "[e]xcept 
as provided in regulations prescribed by the Secretary"). 
'
0 IRC sec. 461 (h)(2)(D). 
21 See Bowers & Stone, "Some Items Still Deductible Under All-
Events Test Despite New Economic Performance Rules," 64 
Journal of Taxation 354, 354 (1986). Because it adds a require-
ment to the all events test, section 461 (h) of course cannot result 
in deductions earlier than permitted under pre-1984 Act law. If 
the all events test and the economic performance requirement 
are satisfied simultaneously, the time of deduction is the same 
whether pre- or post-1984 Act law governs. 
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cost of the liabilities to which the deductions related-so-
called "premature accruals."'' 
Consider a taxpayer that has a present, fixed liability to 
pay $100 in five years for an otherwise deductible ex-
pense. Assume that both prongs of the all events test 
have been satisfied. If no other statutory barrier inter-
vened, the taxpayer could deduct the entire $100 cur-
rently, without any discounting to reflect the time value of 
money. However, a current deduction equals the cost of 
the liability only if the taxpayer is limited to the present 
value of the future obligation, 23 and no Code provision or 
judicial decision has limited a taxpayer to a discounted 
deduction in such circumstances. 24 
The taxpayer could deduct the entire [amount] 
... without any discounting to reflect the time 
value of money. 
Under section 461 (h), if the future liability is associated 
with the provision of property or services, and if the 
property or services are provided in year five, the $100 
will not be deductible until that time. The deduction and 
the true cost of the obligation will, in this example, be 
perfectly meshed at the later date: "Economically, a 
present deduction of the present value [of an obligation 
payable in the future] is equivalent to a future deduction 
22See H.R. Rept. No. 432, 98th Gong., 2d Sess. 1254 (1984) [the 
1984 House Report]; Staff of Senate Finance Committee, 98th 
Gong., 2d Sess., Deficit Reduction Tax Bill of 1984 Explanation 
of Provisions Approved by the Committee on March 21, 1984, at 
271 (1984) [the 1984 Senate Report]; Staff of Joint Committee on 
Taxation, 98th Gong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of the 
Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, at 260 
(Comm. Print 1984) [the 1984 Blue Book]. 
23The present value of that future obligation, using a discount 
rate of five percent compounded semiannually, is $78.12. That 
is, if the taxpayer invested $78.12 today at a five percent after-tax 
rate of return, it would have the $100 in five years necessary to 
satisfy the liability. Other authors have posited extreme cases 
that produce "cost-free" liabilities, where the tax savings from 
the accelerated deduction equals or exceeds the true cost of the 
liability. See, e.g., McGown, "Structured Settlements: Deduct 
Now and Pay Later," 60 TAXES- The Tax Magazine 251,251-53 
(1982). 
"See Burnham Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. No. 62 (1988) 
(noting lack of authority); Sheppard, "Economic Nonperfor-
mance: Doing Without Section 461 (h) Regulations," 40 Tax 
Notes 337, 338-39 (1988) (discussing Burnham Corp.). Commen-
tators have suggested the appropriateness of such discounting 
for accrual-basis taxpayers. See, e.g., Aidinoff & Lopata, "Section 
461 and Accrual-Method Taxpayers: The Treatment of Liabilities 
Arising from Obligations to be Performed in the Future," 33 Tax 
Lawyer789, 811-23 (1980). 
Discounting of present deductions (rather than deferral of 
undiscounted deductions) is required only in certain very spe-
cialized areas. For example, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 requires 
that the deduction available to non-life insurance companies for 
"unpaid losses" be discounted to present value. See IRC sec. 
832(b)(5), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-514, sec. 1022(a). 100 Stat. 2085, 2397-99; IRC sec. 1023(c). 
100 Stat. 2085, 2399-2404. 
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of th!il future value." 25 The statute is not perfect-in some 
circumstances it still permits a taxpayer who is obligated 
to make a future payment to take an undiscounted de-
duction in a year before the payment is made 26-but it is a 
decided improvement over pre-1984 Act law. 
Section 461(h) is undoubtedly an impediment 
[to] . .. the tax planner, who generally wants to 
accelerate deductions . ... 
From the standpoint of the tax planner, who generally 
wants to accelerate deductions, section 461 (h) is un-
doubtedly an impediment. In addition, because its appli-
cation in many cases may be inconsistent with generally 
accepted accounting principles, the economic perfor-
mance standard increases -bookkeeping requirements.· 
Recognizing this fact, Congress provided a potentially 
important exception to the economic performance re-
quirement for "certain recurring items." A liability is 
considered as incurred within a taxable year, even though 
economic performance has not occurred in that year, if 
four conditions are met: 
l. The all events test, applied without an economic 
performance requirement, is satisfied; 
2. Economic performance in fact occurs within a rea-
sonable period after the close of the taxable year (and in 
no event any later than B'h months after such close); 
3. The item is recurring and the taxpayer's treatment is 
consistent from year to year; and 
4. Either the item is not a material item or accrual in the 
taxable year results in a "more proper" matching of 
expenses and income than would accrual in a later year. 27 
The relief provided by the "recurring items" exception 
is more apparent than real, however. The exception 
contains many ambiguities, and, as critics have noted, 
"[l]n many if not most of the cases, it will be difficult to 
determine if the exception is available."28 The materiality-
matching alternative in the fourth requirement is hardly 
self-defining in its application. And how should the sec-
ond requirement, the B'h month test, be applied to a set of 
facts where there is generally, but not always, perfor-
mance within the short period? in a case like General 
Dynamics, for example, should compliance with the test 
"Bradley & Winslow, "Self-Insurance Plans and Captive Insur-
ance Companies-A Perspective on Recent Tax Developments," 
4 American Journal of Tax Policy 217, 233 (1985) (footnote 
omitted); see Gunn, "Matching of Costs and Revenues as a Goal 
of Tax Accounting," 4 Virginia Tax Review 1, 31 n.144 (1984). 
2
'11 the taxpayer in the example receives services (and therefore 
economic performance occurs) in year five but pays the $100 for 
the services in year six, the taxpayer may still receive the 
economic benefit of a deduction that is one year premature 
under the new statute. The present value in year five of the 
obligation to pay $100 in year six is $95.18, using a discount rate 
of five percent compounded semiannually. Ct. note 23, supra. 
However, if lAC sec. 461 (h) is applicable, and no other timing 
rule (such as lAC sec. 83(h) or lAC sec. 404(a)(5)) overrides the 
effect of that section, nothing precludes the taxpayer's taking a 
deduction for the full $100 in year five. 
21 1RC sec. 461 (h)(3)(A). 
25Bowers & Stone, supra note 21, at 356. 
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be measured on an aggregate basis or by use of a claim-
by-claim analysis? 29 
Ill. Footnote 3 
The economic performance requirement did not apply 
in either Hughes Properties or General Dynamics. 30 At 
the time the Court was considering Hughes Properties, 
decided in June 1986, the Justices may not even have 
been aware that the statutory changes could affect the 
analysis of similar cases in the future. 31 
By the time of its decision in General Dynamics less 
than 11 months later, the Court had become aware that 
the statute had changed and that future cases would not 
be analyzed under the principles of General Dynamics 
alone. Indeed, in footnote 3, the Court not only let us 
know that it had become informed that recent legislative 
developments had occurred,32 it also hinted at the effect 
of those changes: . 
We do not address how this case would be decided 
under section 461 (h), but note that the legislative 
history of the Act indicates that, "[i]n the case 
of ... employee benefit liabilities, which require a 
payment by the taxpayer to another person, eco-
nomic performance occurs as the payments to such 
person are made."33 
The Court . .. did precisely what it purported 
not to do: to suggest the resolution . .. under 
the new statute. 
Thus, the Court in one sentence did precisely what it 
purported not to do: to suggest the resolution of a similar 
case under the new statute. 
Some readers of the opinion immediately took the 
footnote at face value, as if it resolved any ambiguity that 
might otherwise have existed. 34 Tax planners should not 
rely on the Supreme Court for tax research, however. The 
Court's gratuitous suggestion does not stand up to scru-
tiny, It has no theoretical basis, and it is an embarrassing 
misreading of legislative history. 
Consider two economically similar cases. If Able per-
forms services for Baker, economic performance is 
deemed to occur with the performance of those services. 
Thus, if the all events test is otherwise met by that time, 
Baker is then entitled to a deduction. If, however, Able 
performs services for an employee of Baker, and Baker is 
29See notes 75-80, infra, and accompanying text (discussing 
similar issue under lAC sec. 404). 
30See note 4, supra· (effective date of changes made by 1984 
Act); see also General Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1735-36 n.3. 
31See Jensen, supra note 5, at 911-12. 
321 suspect that is one of the reasons for the footnote. 
33107 S. Ct. at 1736 n.3 (quoting 1984 House Report at 1255, 
and citing H.R. Rept. No. 861, 98th Gong., 2d Sess. 872 (1984) 
(conference committee explanation of House bill) [the 1984 
Conference Report]. 
34Among the misled were the preparers of the Newsletter of 
the American Bar Association's Section of Taxation. See 6 Sec-
tion of Taxation Newsletter 62-63 {1987). 
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obligated to pay for the services, the Court suggests that 
economic performance occurs only when payment is 
made. From the standpoint of Baker, the party for whom 
services are being performed directly or indirectly, is 
there any principle that justifies a different result in the 
timing of deductions? 
Delay of the deduction until payment is consistent with 
the theory that should have governed section 461 (h); 
such a rule would eliminate premature accruals. 35 That 
theory, however, is not uniformly reflected in the defini-
tions of economic performance. The statute by its terms 
permits the deduction of many liabilities before payment 
occurs,36 and there is nothing obviously peculiar about 
services provided in connection with "employee benefit 
liabilities" that justifies treatment different from the provi-
sion of services generally.37 
In addition, the language of section 461 (h) contains no 
suggestion that medical self-insurance plans should be 
governed by any principle other than that applicable Jo 
"services ... provided to the taxpayer"; that is, economic 
performance occurs as services are performed.36 The 
35See note 26, supra, and accompanying text. 
35See notes 17-20, supra, and accompanying text. Under the 
statute, economic performance is defined as occurring on pay-
ment only with respect to worker's compensation and tort 
liabilities. IRC sec. 461 (h) (2)(C). 
37 lf there are hidden peculiarities that should have controlling 
effect, the Court did not enlighten us about them. Two possibili-
ties come to mind, but neither persuasively requires reading a 
payment requirement into the statute. 
First, in the employee reimbursement situation, it is unclear 
from the statutory language whose services are relevant-that is, 
whether the analytical focus should be on the medical services 
or on the employee's services to the employer. See W. Klein, B. 
Bittker & L. Stone, Federal Income Taxation 437 (7th ed. 1987) 
(assuming performance of medical services is controlling). But 
see note 46, infra, and accompanying text (1984 Conference 
Report suggesting economic performance occurs as the em-
ployee performs services). Whatever uncertainty may exist on 
this point, however, it provides no reason to delay the deduction 
until a still later time, the time of payment. Moreover, the 
uncertainty will have little practical effect because the two types 
of services are in nearly all cases provided simultaneously. The 
medical services are provided to an employee (or family member 
of an employee) during that person's employment. 
Second, in some employer-employee cases, concern may 
arise that the employer's deduction precedes inclusion of in-
come by the employee. Several Code provisions seek to ensure 
"inter-taxpayer matching," deferring a deduction until a corre-
sponding inclusion occurs. See, e.g., IRC sec. 83(h) (deferring 
deduction attributable to compensation-related transfer of prop-
erty until amount is included in gross income of service-pro-
vider). With a plan like that in General Dynamics, however, inter-
taxpayer matching cannot be effected if the employer is to be 
entitled to a deduction: the reimbursement of the medical 
expenses is generally excludable from the gross income of the 
employees. See IRC sec. 105(b). But see IRC sec. 89 (new provi-
sion denying exclusion of benefits to highly compensated em-
ployees if benefit plan is discriminatory). 
JBIRC sec. 461 (h)(2)(A) provides: 
If the liability of the taxpayer arises out of-
(i) the providing of services to the taxpayer by another 
person, economic performance occurs as such person 
provides such services, 
(ii) the providing of property to the taxpayer by another 
person, economic performance occurs as the person 
provides such property, or 
(iii) the use of the property by the taxpayer, economic 
performance occurs as the taxpayer uses such property. 
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government could argue that the medical services (as-
suming those are the critical services for analytical pur-
poses39) are not being provided to the "taxpayer," a self-
insured employer like General Dynamics, but such an 
argument is formalistic at best. If the services are provided 
at a taxpayer's expense pursuant to a contract between 
the taxpayer and its employees, they are being provided 
for the indirect benefit of the taxpayer-employer. 
The language that the Court quoted . .. applied 
to a version of the 1984/egislation that was not 
enacted. 
This leaves no theoretical basis for distinguishing the 
two hypothetical cases involving services, and the Court's 
suggestion about the effect of section 461 (h) is therefore 
suspect. It is perhaps unfair to chastise the Court for not 
providing a justification grounded in theory on an issue 
that the Court purported not to have addressed. But the 
failure on this point goes beyond lack of theoretical 
sophistication. The language that the Court quoted from 
the legislative history applied to a version of the 1984 
legislation that was not enacted. Any lawyer who deals 
with statutes knows that one must examine interpretive 
passages in a congressional committee report in light of 
the language that the report is interpreting; we should 
expect no less from the Justices and clerks of the United 
States Supreme Court. 
The full language of the committee report, without the 
Court's artful ellipsis, provides that, "[i]n the case of 
worker's compensation, tort, and employee benefit liabili-
ties, which require a payment by the taxpayer to another 
person, economic performance occurs as the payments 
to such person are made."40 That passage interprets 
language in the House bill that said precisely the same 
thing-language applying to the three named categories 
of liabilities.'' 'But that language did not survive the 
legislative process intact. At some point in the House-
Senate conference committee deliberations, the bill's 
reference to "employee benefit liabilities" was deleted. 42 
The Code section as enacted treats "payment" as the 
event of economic performance only for worker's com-
pensation and tort liabilitiesY If "payment" is to constitute 
39See note 37, supra. 
401984 House Report at 1255. 
"H.R. 4170, 98th Gong., 2d Sess., sec. 91 (a). reprinted in 1984 
House Report. In the bill, employee benefits subject to the rules 
of sections 404 (dealing with certain deferred compensation 
plans). 404A (dealing with foreign deferred compensation plans), 
and 419 (dealing with defined welfare benefit funds) were 
excepted from the economic performance rules of proposed 
section 461 (h). 
"The Senate bill was similar to the House version, defining 
economic performance as payment to another person for the 
same three named categories of liabilities. That bill included the 
same exceptions (see note 41, supra) and added another: if 
payments were made within 2% months after the close of the 
taxable year, the special rule for "employee benefit liabilities" 
was not to apply. Thus, in such a case, economic performance 
would be defined as the time of services, not the time of 
payment. S. 2062, 98th Gong., 2d Sess., sec. 71 (a), reprinted in 
1984 Senate Report. 
43IRC sec. 461 (h)(2)(C). 
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economic performance in other circumstances, it is only 
because regulations have so provided.4 4 
The conference committee report does not explain why 
the statutory reference to "employee benefit liabilities" 
was dropped. The Supreme Court may be right in imply-
ing that economic performance and hence deduction in 
such cases should await payment, but that is a peculiar 
inference to draw from Congress' deletion. of a phrase 
that would have unequivocally secured that result. 45 And 
the conference committee suggested that economic per-
formance may occur prior to (or simultaneously with) the 
provision of medical services: "economic performance 
with respect to a liability to an employee generally occurs 
as the employee renders his or her services."46 
We can on I~ speculate about the reason for the deletion 
of the bill's reference to "employee benefit liabilities." 
44See notes 19-20, supra, and accompanying text. The implica- · 
lion of this scheme is that for those events specifically addressed 
in the statute, such as the provision of services, regulations 
should redefine the time of economic performance only in 
special circumstances. 
45See notes 51-80, infra, and accompanying text (suggesting 
proper post-1984 Act analysis). It is true that deferral of a deduc-
tion until payment would eliminate the premature accrual effect. 
See note 26, supra, andaccompanying text. It is also true that, 
when there is substantial doubt about the time of economic 
performance, the legislative language should be interpreted in .a 
way that reduces premature accruals. But the Court was making 
no argument about the proper method of interpretation in a 
world of uncertainty; it merely quoted language from a question-
ably relevant committee report. 
"1 984 Conference Report at 877 (emphasis added). The 
Supreme Court had cited to the conference committee report 
(see note 33, supra) as if that report supported its suggestive 
nonsuggestion about "employee benefit liabilities." However, 
the page citation is to the conference committee's description of 
the House bill, not to a discussion of the committee's own 
product. 1984 Conference Report at 872. 
The 1984 Blue Book gives support to the Supreme Court's 
implication: "Economic performance with respect to employee 
benefits (other than compensation) occurs generally when the 
employer mal<es a payment under the benefit plan (rather than 
when the services are rendered)." 1984 Blue Book at 267. If this 
language is intended to explain section 461 (h), however, its 
statutory underpinnings are obscure. 
Perhaps the 1984 Blue Book language merely means that 
other statutory sections, such as IRC sec. 404 (see notes 53-80, 
infra, and accompanying text) may often defer deductions until 
payment and thus may have the· effect of preempting section 
461 (h). So interpreted, the language would be less objection-
able. However, an example provided in the Blue Book suggests 
that the Joint Committee staff intended the language to mean 
precisely what it says about the time of economic performance. 
See the 1984 Blue Book at 267 (contribution to trust under 
funded welfare benefit plan that, because of effective date of IRC 
sec. 419, was not governed by that section, said to be deductible 
only at time of payment under IRC sec. 461 (h)). See note 53, 
intra (describing effect of IRC sec. 419). 
If the Blue Book language was intended to explain section 
461, as it apparently was, it should be given little interpretive 
weight since it is arguably contrary to the conference committee 
report. Cf. Bank of Clearwater v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 289, 
2984 (1 985) (emphasis added): 
II is this court's view that, although said Joint Committee 
Explanation prepared by the staff does not rise to the level 
of authority given to legislative history, we do not perceive 
it as totally worthless or unenlightening. It is common 
knowledge that the congressional staff of the Joint Com-
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(Footnote 46 continued 
on next column.) 
One possibility is that the conference committee deter-
mined such a liability is likely to have a sufficiently short 
"tail," the time between accrual and payment, that the 
economic benefit from an accelerated deduction is within 
acceptable limits." In contrast, because they may be 
discharged in installments over extended periods of time, 
worker's compensation and tort liabilities are precisely 
the kind of potentially abusive liabilities that most con-
cerned many commentators.4" 
Another possible explanation, tor which there is a great 
deal of circumstantial evidence, is that the committee 
concluded no special reference to "employee benefit 
liabilities" is necessary in section 461 (h) because the 
timing effect of such liabilities is generally to be deter-
mined under other statutory provisions. 49 Indeed, the 
conference committee note'd that "an employer's deduc-
(Footnote 46 continued.) 
mittee works very closely with the members of Congress 
in drafting legislation and undoubtedly has "eyeball knowl-
edge" of the fundamental legislative purpose of a given 
piece of legislation. Abserit any definitive legislative history 
that is more revealing, the court believes it is proper 
nonetheless, in the absence of any comparable contrary 
assertions, to give substantial weight to this Explanation. 
At the very least, it should receive no less recognition than 
a thesis of a text writer ori a given point. 
The Blue Book is a staff-prepared report, not reviewed by either 
congressional tax committee. It merely reflects the staff's under-
standing of congressional intent. See Staff of Joint Committee 
on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 
at Ill (Comm. Print 1976). 
47Congress' views about what constitutes an acceptably short 
tail are evolving, as the change in the treatment of vested 
vacation pay demonstrates. The 1984 Act contained a specific 
provision limiting an employer's current deduction for vacation 
pay earned during the taxable year to amounts paid within 8% 
months of that year's end. See I RC sec. 463(a). prior to repeal by 
Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, sec. 10201 (a), 101 
Stat: 1330-382, 1330-387; cf. note 27, supra, and accompanying 
text (8% month requirement of "recurring items" exception). 
However, by repealing section 463 (and making conforming 
changes elsewhere in the Code), Congress in the 1987 Act 
effectively reduced the critical period for vacation pay to 2% 
months after the end of the year in which it was earned. See H.R. 
Rep!. No. 495, 100 Cong., 1st Sess. 921 (1987) [the 1987 
Conference Report]. 
'"See Bradley & Winslow, supra note 25, at 232. In Rev. Rul. 
69-429, 1969-2 C.B. 108, the Service had ruled that, in the case of 
a worker's compensation settlement award to be paid in install-
ments over several years, a self-insured employer could deduct 
the total undiscounted amount of the future awards in the year 
of settlement. (For example, if the obligation were to pay $1,000 
per year for 10 years, the employer could currently deduct the 
full $10,000, rather than the present value of the future stream of 
payments.) Imaginative planners urged the use of this principle 
in structuring tort settlements as well. See McGown, supra note 
23, at 252-53. In certain extreme cases, it was possible to 
structure a settlement that, because of the value of the current, 
undiscounted tax deduction, provided an overall economic bene-
fit to the payor. In response to one such example, Professor 
Gunn remarked, "If this is the law [prior to the 1984 Act]. well-
advised accrual-method businesses should cancel their liability 
insurance and run down pedestrians at the rate of at least one a 
year." Gunn, supra note 25, at 26. 
49The Supreme Court's quotation from the House Report 
assumed, however, that IRC sec. 461 (h) was to be the controlling 
provision. See text accompanying note 33, supra. 





tion for compensation or other benefits paid to an em-
ployee in a year subsequent to economic performance is 
subject to the rules in the Code ... governing deferred 
compensation, deferred benefits, and funded welfare 
benefit plans."50 The committee suggested, that is, that 
even though economic performance is deemed to occur 
as the employee performs his services (subject, of course, 
to the Treasury's power to change the rules), other 
sections may require deferral of the employer's deduc-
tion beyond the time of economic performance. 
In Part IV, this article attempts to locate the analysis of 
employee benefit liabilities like those at issue in General 
Dynamics within the new statutory scheme. As we shall 
see, footnote 3 is not helpful in that process. 
The analysis of employee benefit liabilities is 
enormously complex. 
IV. Unfunded Medical Reimbursement Plans 
The analysis of employee benefit liabilities is enor-
mously complex. 51 Merely locating the proper analytical 
starting point in the Code for a particular liability can 
confuse thevery best lawyers. 52 This article cannot pro-
vide the definitive treatise on the deductibility of amounts 
related to unfunded medical reimbursement plans; it is 
enough for present purposes to demonstrate that the 
Supreme Court's suggestion about post-1984 Act law is 
misleading. For those lawyers educated about employee 
benefits, the Court has added confusion to an already 
confused area. For inexperienced lawyers, the Court 
applied a veneer of simplicity to an area that is decidedly 
not simple. 
A. Unfunded Plans Providing Deferred Benefits 
If a medical reimbursement plan is unfunded, 53 and if 
the plan provides "deferred benefits," then, under section 
501984 Conference Report at 877. Accordingly, since employee 
benefit liabilities are not included in the rule defining economic 
performance as payment, the House and Senate bills' references 
to sections 404, 404A. and 419 as exceptions to that rule were 
unnecessary. See notes 41-42, supra. 
51 Part IV of this article can only suggest the necessary .com-
plexity. The analysis of medical reimbursement plans provided 
here assumes the inapplicability of IRC sec. 83(h}, which applies 
to compensation-related transfers of "property," not including 
money, Reg. section 1.83-3(e}; and IRC sec. 404A, dealing with 
certain foreign deferred compensation plans. An employee bene-
fits lawyer must of course be familiar with these sections as well 
as the complex provisions governing qualified benefit plans. 
52The autho~ has seen such issues discussed by major law 
firms in. memoranda that ignore the effects of some of the 
potentially crucial Code sections. See also W. Klein, B. Bittker & 
L. Stone, supra note 37, at 437 (ignoring IRC sec. 404}. 
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"Unfunded" means, for this purpose, that the reimbursement 
obligation will be discharged through the use of the employer's 
general funds. The employer has taken no steps to segregate 
assets (through separate trusts, bank accounts, and so on} to 
meet the obligation. 
Despite the "unfunded" nomenclature, we would have to 
assure ourselves that the arrangement did not constitute a 
"funded welfare benefit plan" governed by IRC sec. 419. IRC 
sec. 419 and its companion provision, IRC sec. 419A (dealing 
with qualified asset accounts}, were added to the Code by the 
Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, sec. 511 (a}. 98 Stat. 
TAX NOTES, November 7, 1988 
(Footnote 53 continued 
on next column.) 
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404, 54 the employer may deduct otherwise deductible55 
amounts only as they are includable in the gross income 
of employees (or as they would be includable were it not 
(Footnote 53 continued.) 
494, 854-61, and were amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 1851, 100 Stat. 2085, 2858-63. If section 
419 did apply, the employer would effectively be put on a cash 
basis, with contributions deductible (subject to some limita-
tions} only as paid to a "welfare benefit fund." 
A "welfare benefit fund" is a "fund which ... is part of a plan of 
an employer, and ... through which the employer provides wel-
fare benefits to employees or their beneficiaries." IRC sec. 
419(e}(1 }. "Welfare benefits," in general, are all benefits other 
than those governed by IRC sec. 83(h}, IRC sec. 404, or IRC sec. 
404A. IRC sec. 419(e}(2); see note 41, supra (describing other 
cited Code sections}. 
Without a segregated account or fund created specifically to 
cover the plan's obligations, a reimbursement plan should avoid 
the application of IRC sec. 419. A "fund" is in general defined as 
one of several enumerated tax-exempt organizations; a trust, 
corporation, or other taxable entity; and, "to the extent provided 
in regulations, any account held for an employer by any person." 
IRC sec. 419(e}(3). The legislative history provides some guid-
ance on what constitutes a "fund." 
In prescribing regulations relating to the definition of the 
term "fund," the conferees wish to emphasize that the 
principal purpose of this provision ... is to prevent em-
ployers from taking premature deductions, for expenses 
which have not yet been incurred, by interposing an 
intermediary organization which holds assets which are 
used to provide benefits to the employees of the employer. 
1984 Conference Report at 1155. The House Report indicated in 
a footnote, however, that "employer contributions to a separate 
bank account of the employer or to a subsidiary or other related 
party would not be considered contributions to a fund." 1984 
House Report at 1280 n.18. 
The analysis can be particularly confusing, and the possibility 
of application of IRC sec. 419 therefore correspondingly greater, 
if the employer interposes a third party administrator, such as an 
insurance company, for the plan. Temporary regulations have 
provided: 
[l]f an employer makes a payment to an insurance com-
pany under an "administrative services only" arrangement 
with respect to which the life insurance company main-
tains a separate account to provide benefits, then the 
arrangement would be considered to be a "fund." 
Temp. Reg. sec. 1.419-1 T, A-3(c}. But see Announcement 86-45, 
1986-15 I.R.S. 52 (clarifying arrangements with insurance com-
panies that will be classified as "funds"}. 
54 IRC sec. 404 was modified in both 1984 and 1986. The most 
noteworthy modification for present purposes was the addition 
of IRC sec. 404(b}(2). See note 56, infra. Tax Reform Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-369, sec. 512(a}. 98 Stat. 494, 862-63. 
55 IRC sec. 404(a} provides, in relevant part, that 
if compensation is paid or accrued on account of any em-
ployee under a plan deferring the receipt of such compen-
sation, such ... compensation shall not be deductible un-
der this chapter; but, if they [sic] would otherwise be 
deductible, they [sic] shall be deductible under thissec-
tion, subject, however, to the following limitations as to 
the amounts deductible in any year. 
(Emphasis added.} Among the specified limitations is that of IRC 
sec. 404(a}(5}. See note 56, infra. 
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, IRC sec. 404(a} required 
that the deductions be otherwise available under either IRC sec. 
162 or sec. 212. The 1986 Act substituted the less restrictive 
"otherwise be deductible" language. Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 






for a statutory exclusion). 56 The requirement that the 
amount "otherwise be deductible" means not only that 
the expense must be an ordinary and necessary business 
expense (or have another statutory basis for deduction), 
but also that the statutory timing requirements must be 
met.57 By its terms, section 404 acts only as a deferral 
provision: wh,en the threshold all events test, as modified 
by the economic performance requirement, has been 
satisfied, the employer must consider whether section 
404 requires still further deferral. 
Integrating these statutory pieces-the all events test, 
the economic performance requirement, and section404-
in a simple example may be helpful. Assume that an em-
ployee performed services for an accrual-basis employer 
in 1987, received medical services and filed a claim for 
reimburseme-nt in 1987, and is reimbursed for his medical 
costs under his employer's unfunded plan in 1988. As-
sume also that both the employer and employee have a 
calendar-year taxable year_ The General Dynamics Court 
said the all events test is satisfied upon filing a claim for 
reimbursement-here 1987 (if the reasonable accuracy 
requirement is met at that time58). Under section 461 (h), 
prior to any regulatory modification, economic perfor-
mance is apparently deemed to have occurred as the em-
ployee performed his services, also in 1987.59 But absent 
a statutory exclusion rule, the employee, as a cash-basis 
taxpayer, would have to include the reimbursed amounts 
"IRC sec. 404(b)(2), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-369, sec. 512(a), 98 Stat. 494, 862-63, requires 
treating "any plan providing for deferred benefits (other than 
compensation) for employees ... as a plan deferring the receipt 
of compensation"-thus subject to the timing rules of IRC sec. 
404(a)-and IRC sec. 404(b)(1) includes in the category of 
"plan" for this purpose any method or arrangement having the 
effect of a plan. IRC sec. 404(a)(5) in general requires deferring 
the deduction for an unfunded plan until "the taxable year in 
which an amount attributable to the contribution is includable in 
the gross income of employees participating in the plan." In 
determining timing, it is irrelevant that medical reimbursement 
would generally be excludable from the gross income of em-
ployees. See note 37, supra. IRC sec. 404(b)(2) (A). 
Like the economic performance rules, IRC sec. 404(b)(2), as 
amended, is generally effective after July 18, 1984, the date of 
enactment of the 1984 Act. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-369, sec. 512(c), 98 Stat. 494, 863; Temp. Reg. sec. 1.404(b)-
1T, A-3. 
The analysis undertaken here is of reimbursement plans for 
employees, but IRC sec. 404(d) in general applies the same 
timing rules to deferred compensation and deferred benefits 
provided to independent contractors. 
''Temp. Reg. sec. 1.461 (h)-4T (1986) provides that, "[i]n the 
case of an accrual method taxpayer, a contribution or compen-
sation satisfies the requirements of sections 162 or 212 [i.e., is 
deemed to "otherwise be deductible," see note 55, supra (1986 
Act change in language of IRC sec. 404(a))] only to the extent 
that the all events test ... and the economic performance require-
ment. .. are satisfied." 
58The government had challenged the reasonable accuracy of 
General Dynamics' claimed deduction in the lower courts be-
cause the deduction exceeded the amount later paid for claims 
by nearly 20 percent. The government was unsuccessful, how-
ever, see General Dynamics, 6 Cl. Ct. at 256; 773 F.2d at 1226, 
and it did not raise the issue in its petition for certiorari. See note 
8, supra. 
59See note 46, supra, and accompanying text. 
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in income as received, in 1988. If this plan is a deferred 
benefit plan-and from a common sense standpoint it 
is60-section 404 requires deferring the employer's de-
duction until1988, the year of payment, despite apparent 
compliance with section 461 (h) in 1987. 
The conclusion that 1988 is the appropriate year of de-
duction is reinforced by another consideration. Notwith-
standing the suggestion in the legislative history, 61 the 
economic performance requirement will not have been 
met in 1987. Under its statutory authority to modify sec-
tion 461 (h) definitions, 52 the Treasury has issued tempo-
rary regulations defining economic performance, in the 
case of a deferred benefit that is governed by section 404 
and that is received by a cash-basis taxpayer, as the time 
of payment. 63 
The Supreme Court's suggestion . . . appears to 
be . .. accidentally right . ... 
The analysis has come full circle. Economic perfor-
mance, according to the temporary regulations, is pay-
ment. The Supreme Court's suggestion in General Dy-
namics that the employer's deduction must await the year 
of payment therefore appears to be right-accidentally 
right, to be sure, but right nonetheless. 64 So interpreted, 
the economic performance requirement merely leads to a 
result that section 404 would have provided anyway. Note 
also that, if section 404 applies, the "recurring items" 
exception to the economic performance requirement 
makes no difference in the result. 55 At least one commen-
tator has suggested that the exception should apply to 
medical reimbursement plans. 66 Even if that is correct-
and it is not at all clear67-section 404 should still defer 
the deduction until the time of paymentfor any deferred 
benefit. 
Why should we care that the Supreme Court cited an . 
irrelevant piece of legislative history if the citation points 
us in the right direction? Section B discusses that ques-
tion. 
60 lt provides a deferred benefit in that the employee performed 
the services in 1987 but receives the benefit, the reimbursement, 
in 1988. 
"'See note 46, supra, and accompanying text. · 
"See note 19, supra, and accompanying text. 
63 ln the case of a contribution or compensation subject to 
section 404 ... , pursuant to the authority under section 
461 (h)(2), economic performance occurs ... in the case of 
a plan subject to section 404, either as the contribution is 
made under the plan or, if section 404(a)(5) is applicable, 
as an amount attributable to such contribution is includ-
ible in the gross income of an employee. 
Temp. Reg. sec. 1.461(h)-4T, A-1 (1986). 
64The temporary regulations were promulgated on January 29, 
1986, in T.D. 8073, 1986-1 C.B. 42, and thus were available long 
before the Supreme Court's decision in General Dynamics. A 
citation to these regulations would have been more helpful to 
readers than the Court's citation to the House Report. 
65See notes 27-29, supra, and accompanying text. 
66See Note, "Tightening the Prongs on the 'All Events' Test: 
United States v. General Dynamics Corp.," 41 Tax Lawyer 523, 
538 (1988). 
"See text accompanying note 28, supra. 





Deductibility of Claims for Medical Services Performed in 1987 
(1) (2) (4) (5) 
Filing of Claim 
(All Events Payment of 







(If Not a 
'Recurring Item')' Year of Deduction3 
1987 Before 3/16/88 No 
1987 After 3/15/88 Yes' 
1988 Before 3/1B/88 No 
1988 After 3/15/88 Yes' 





1987 (All events test and economic performance have 
occurred; sec. 404 does not apply) 
1988 (Sec. 404 controls) 
1988 (All events test not met until filing) 
1988 (Sec. 404 controls) 
'If "recurring items" exception is applicable, the unmodified economic performance requirement does not apply. 
'Whether or not "recurring items" exception applies. 
'Assuming presumption that payments were made more than "brief period" after end of year cannot be rebutted. 
B. What Are Deferred Benefits? 
As convoluted as the above statutory analysis may 
seem, the real world is even more complex. We should 
care about the Court's sloppiness because the Court may 
well not have pointed us in the fight direction. A more 
detailed statutory map is necessary, and some of the 
terrain is yet to be charted. The above analysis was 
premised on the assumption that a medical reimburse-
ment plan is necessarily a deferred benefit plan.68 How-
ever, under the temporary regulations, and with support 
in the legislative history, 69 benefits are treated as deferred 
only if they are received more than a "brief period of 
time" after the end of the employer's taxable year, 70 and a 
plan is presumed to defer benefits for more than a brief 
period only if they are received more than 2'h months 
after the close of that year.71 
••see Accounting_ Periods and Methods, Para. 203.031, at 370 
(CCH Tax Transactions Library) (T.J. Purcell ed. 1987) (ap-
parently assuming that medical reimbursement plans are gov-
erned by deferred benefit rules). 
"[T]he conferees intend that payment of bonuses or other 
amounts within 2'12 months after the close of the taxable 
year in which significant services required for payment 
have been performed is not to be considered a deferred 
compensation or deferred benefit plan. 
1984 Conference Report at 1160. See also 1984 House Report at 
1284 ("brief period" rule); 1984 Blue Book at 805 (to same 
effect). The Senate version of the bill would have codified the 2% 
month standard. See note 42, supra. 
70Temp. Reg. sec. 1.404(b)-1T, A-2(a) (1986). 
71 Temp. Reg. sec. 1.404(b)-1T, A-2(b)(1) (1986). The regulatory 
2'h month rule, first alluded to in legislative language later 
dropped (see note 42, supra), overturned the prior position of 
the Internal Revenue Service, under which a plan was treated as 
a deferred compensation or deferred benefit plan only if it 
deferred a payment for more than 12 months after the close of 
the taxable year in which the employer incurred a liability under 
the plan. See, e.g., L TR 82-06-169 (Nov. 17, 1981); L TR 80-06-
067 (Nov. 19, 1979) (citing New York Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. 
Commissioner, 50 T.C. 391 (1968) (severance pay plan held to 
be deferred compensation plan where it provided employees 
terminating after more than five years' continuous serl!ice with 
one week's pay for each year of service); and Lundy Packing Co . 
v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 182 (C.D.N.C. 1969), aff'd per 
curiam, 421 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1970) (sick pay plan held to be 
deferred compensation plan where it entitled the employee to 
TAX NOTES, November 7, 1988 
(Footnote 71 continued 
on next column.) 
The hypothetical medical reimbursement plan therefore 
is not necessarily a deferred benefit plan. Suppose the 
plan by its terms required that all claims for medical 
services received in 1987 be filed in time that the claims 
could be paid by March 15, 1988. In such a case, no 
benefits were deferred more than a brief period beyond 
the eni:l of 1987, and section 404 therefore would not 
apply. The timing of the employer's deduction would be 
governed solely by the all events test, as modified by the 
economic performance requirement. For those claims 
filed in 1987 under the plan, the fact of liability was then 
fixed. The temporary regulations do not specify that 
economic performance occurs upon payment in the case 
of an unfunded plan not governed by section 404. 72 The 
statutory definitions of economic performance should 
therefore control: economic performance occurred in 
1987 with the performance of services. Accordingly, with 
the all events test satisfied and economic performance 
having occurred in 1987, the employer should have been 
(Footnote 71 continued.) 
one week's pay per year when unable to work or upon termina-
tion of employment). See also Letter from Calvin H. Johnson to 
David Brockway (July 2, 1985) (criticizing vagueness of definition 
of "deferred" .(prior to issuance of temporary regulations) and 
resultant possibility of planning severely premature accruals), 
reprinted in 28 Tax Notes 920 (1985). 
Congress gave its stamp of approval to the 2% month period 
when, in the Revenue Act of 1987, it repealed IRC sec. 463, 
dealing with the accrual of vested vacation pay. See note 47, 
supra. No Code section specifically provides for the 2'12 month 
grace period. Nevertheless, the committee reports assume that, 
without section 463, an employer can deduct vacation pay in the 
year earned if it is in fact paid within 2% months of that year's 
end. See 1987 Conference Report at 921; S. Rept. No. 63, 100th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1987) [the 1987 Senate Report]. 
The temporary regulation merely creates a presumption. If 
benefits are provided outside the 2% month period, the employer 
may seek to demonstrate that the benefits were nonetheless 
provided within a "brief period of time." To rebut the presump-
tion, the employer must show that it was impracticable, either 
administratively or economically, to avoid the further deferral 
and that, as of the end of the taxable year, the impracticability 
was unforeseeable. Temp. Reg. sec. 1.404(b)-1T, A-2(b)(2) 
(1986). 
"See note 63, supra. 
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entitled to a deduction in that year, even if payment was 
not made until1988. 73 
It may seem perverse that the effect of this analysis is 
to permit an employer a deduction, in some circum-
stances, earlier for an unfunded plan than it would be 
entitled for a contribution to a "funded welfare benefit 
plan."74 This shows only that perversity and the Internal 
Revenue Code are not mutually exclusive. 
This shows only that perversity and the Internal 
Revenue Code are not mutually exclusive. 
Add another real world assumption. Suppose the plan 
did not require that all reimbursements attributable to 
1987 medical services be made by March 15, 1988; 
perhaps, in the interest of labor harmony, the employer 
wished to honor late claims. 75 The plan thus provided 
deferred benefits,1 6 but not all of the benefits were de-
ferred. Many claims were in fact paid by the end of the 2% 
month period, but others were not. Is the overall medical 
reimbursement plan now simply a deferred benefit plan, 
so that section 404 governs the timing of deductions for 
all reimbursed claims under the plan? Or perhaps the 
plan should be bifurcated: those claims for 19137 expenses 
paid by March 15, 1988, were potentially deductible in 
1987, while claims paid after that date are treated as 
deferred benefits, deductible only on payment. 
The answer is not totally clear under the temporary 
regulations, but it appears either that bifurcation is appro-
priate77 or, perhaps even more surprising, that each em-
ployee should be treated as having his or her own 
73As before, if the recurring items exception applies, it makes 
no difference in the result. See text accompanying note 65, 
supra. Even if the economic performance requirement need not 
be met, the year of deduction remains 1987, when the all events 
test was satisfied. 
74See note 53, supra (IRC sec. 419 defers such a deduction 
until year of payment to fund). 
75General Dynamics honored claims that were filed substan-
tially later (as much as two years) than required under the terms 
of the plans. Joint Appendix at 131, General Dynamics (No. 
85-1385). 
76 Under these circumstances it does not appear possible to 
rebut the presumption that the benefits were paid outside the 
"brief period." See note 71, supra. At the end of 1987, it would 
have been foreseeable that late payments were to be made. See 
note 71, supra. · 
"Bifurcation is supported by the legislative history associated 
with the repeal of IRC sec. 463. See notes 47 and 71, supra. The 
1987 Conference Report suggests that vested vacation pay not 
paid in the year earned should be divided into two components. 
For employees in the aggregate, the part of any vacation pay 
paid within 2V, months of year's end would be deductible in the 
year earned; the rest would become deductible only upon 
payment. 1 987 Conference Report at 921. Congress viewed this 
treatment as exemplifying a more general principle: the reason 
for the repeal of section 463 was to eliminate "the disparity in tax 
treatment between vacation pay and other deferred benefits." 
1987 Senate Report at 144. 
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"plan."78 Under either line of analysis-whether the medi-
cal reimbursement scheme is chopped into two pieces or 
splintered still further for analytical purposes-the Su-
preme Court's suggestion is wrong. The self-insurer's 
liability for some claims could be deductible prior to the 
year of payment, assuming that the reasonable accuracy 
of the claimed deductions (the amount of the liability) 
can be demonstrated.7s 
Imaginative tax planning did not die with footnote 3 of 
General Dynamics. Consistent with its method of ac-
counting,80 a careful taxpayer may still be able modestly 
to accelerate deductions associated with unfunded medi-
cal reimbursement plans. In light of this analysis, Table 1 
outlines the tax treatment of claims arising from medical 
services provided in 1987 to employees of a self-insured, 
accrual-basis taxpayer that has the calendar year as its 
taxable year. 
·v. Conclusion 
The Supreme Court did mislead us. Classification of a 
liability as an "employee benefit liability" merely begins a 
complex analysis, an analysis full of uncertainties. Despite 
the Court's implication, economic performance does not 
necessarily occur at the time (and for the reason) stated 
in footnote 3 in General Dynamics, and the time of 
economic performance might well not be a controlling 
consideration in any event. 
Because of these complexities and uncertainties, the 
Court's suggestion in General Dynamics was particularly 
inappropriate. The Court prides itself on leaving issues 
not before it for another day. The treatment of unfunded 
medical reimbursement plans under post-1984 Act law 
was an issue that should not have been discussed in the 
General Dynamics opinion. By offering gratuitous advice, 
the Court demonstrated nothing but the wisdom of its 
usual policy of restraint. 
78The temporary regulations provide that "[b]enefits are 'de-
ferred benefits' if, assuming the benefits were cash compen-
sation, such benefits would be considered deferred compensa-
tion." Temp. Reg. sec. 1.404(b)-1T, A-2(b)(1) (1986). And the 
regulations provide a relevant example of a cash arrangement 
whose possible treatment as deferred compensation is deter-
mined employee-by-employee: 
/d. 
[S]alary or a year-end bonus received beyond the appli-
cable 2'h month period by one employee shall be pre-
sumed to constitute payment under a plan, or method or 
arrangement, deferring the receipt of compensation for 
such employee even though salary or bonus payments to 
all other employees are not similarly treated because they 
are received within the 2'h month period. 
79The amount of liability question did not receive Supreme 
Court scrutiny in General Dynamics, although it should have 
been examined. See Jensen, supra note 3, at 246-249; Sheppard, 
supra note 24, at 340 ("General Dynamics ... appears to be a 
reasonable accuracy case decided as a fixed liability case."); 
note 58, supra. Without guidance on this point, it is difficult to 
know how much further uncertainty the amount of liability issue 
will add in the typical real world situation. For those inclined to 
take an aggressive stance, it is certainly helpful that General 
Dynamics prevailed on this issue in the lower courts. See note 
58, supra. 
8
°Conforming to the requirements of General Dynamics may 
constitute a change in method of accounting for some taxpayers, 
and the Secretary of the Treasury's permission may therefore be 
required for the change. IRC sec. 446(e). 
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